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Can	the	Eurozone	be	more	democratic?
How	the	Eurozone	will	be	governed	in	the	future	is	a	matter	of	much	debate	and	is	expected	to	form	a
key	part	of	the	European	Council	meeting	on	28-29	June.	Kevin	Featherstone	argues	that	the	debate
is	neglecting	a	key	set	of	questions:	how	can	its	governance	be	made	more	democratic	and
accountable?	The	answers	to	these	questions	will	likely	impact	on	the	expansion	or	shrinking	of	the
countries	participating	in	the	euro	in	the	longer-term.
The	current	debate	on	reforming	the	eurozone	is	fixated	on	questions	of	completing	the	banking	union,	the	creation
of	an	expanded	stabilisation	fund,	and	new	forms	of	fiscal	governance.	What	is	missing	here	is	serious	discussion	of
how,	at	a	minimum,	the	application	of	EU-level	fiscal	rules	and	programmes	at	the	domestic	level	can	meet
acceptable	criteria	of	democracy	and	legitimacy.	More	ambitiously,	ideas	of	eurozone	institution-building	risk
alienating	voters	further	if	they,	too,	lack	new	forms	of	accountability.
The	debate	over	the	reform	of	the	eurozone	has	rumbled	on,	responding	to	the	unprecedented	‘bailouts’	among
member	countries.	The	‘Four	Presidents’	Report’,	then	the	‘Five	Presidents’	Report’,	a	Commission	White	Paper,	and
a	Reflection	Paper	each	recognised	that	“greater	responsibility	and	integration	at	EU	and	euro	area	level	should	go
hand	in	hand	with	greater	democratic	accountability,	legitimacy	and	institutional	strengthening”,	as	the	Five
Presidents	put	it.
But	the	debate	was	suddenly	heightened	by	the	ambitious	pronouncements	of	the	new	French	President,	Emmanuel
Macron,	last	year	—	particularly,	his	‘Initiative	for	Europe’	launched	at	the	Sorbonne	in	September.	Keen	not	to	be
overtaken,	the	EU	Commission	President,	Jean-Claude	Juncker,	made	further,	parallel	proposals	in	December.	The
key	bargaining	is,	inevitably,	between	Paris	and	Berlin,	where	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	faces	difficulty	in	getting	her
Christian	Democratic	Union	(CDU)	party	on	board,	even	if	she	wished	to.	It’s	not	clear	how	she	will	make	good	on
her	initial	warm	words	to	Macron	when	the	matter	is	discussed	by	the	European	Council	at	its	meeting	on	28–29
June.	The	intention	was	to	agree	a	roadmap	for	eurozone	reform	at	the	summit,	but	few	now	expect	any	bold	moves
to	be	made	soon.	This	slow	pace	of	progress	is	risky.
The	key	bargaining	is,	inevitably,	between	Paris	and	Berlin.-
There	is	a	logic	and	coherence	behind	the	French	ideas	on	institutional	reform.	Indeed,	they	hark	back,	in	part,	to	the
notions	of	economic	governance	floated	by	Pierre	Bérégovoy	in	the	late	1980s,	when	he	was	the	French	finance
minister.	Last	year,	Macron	called	for	the	creation	of	a	new	permanent	post	of	a	European	finance	minister,	a
separate	European	Parliament	for	the	eurozone,	and	a	‘real’	eurozone	budget,	crystallising	the	ideas	that	had	been
floating	around	EU	circles	in	recent	years.	At	the	Sorbonne	he	said,	“we	need	convergence	and	stability	through
national	reforms,	but	also	by	coordinating	our	economic	policies	and	a	common	budget”,	and	argued	that	the	“budget
must	be	placed	under	the	strong	political	guidance	of	a	common	minister	and	be	subject	to	strict	parliamentary
control	at	[the]	European	level”.	Macron	signalled	that	the	European	minister	should	be	linked	to	a	new	executive
function	dealing	with	macroeconomic	policy.	With	this	in	mind,	Juncker	then	reformulated	the	idea	to	suggest	the
minister	might	also	be	a	vice	president	of	the	EU	Commission.	This	risks	subverting	Macron’s	bold	innovation,
however,	under	a	structure	designed	for	the	more	limited	European	Economic	Community	in	the	1950s	which,	by
elevating	a	technocratic	elitism,	is	seen	as	being	out	of	synch	with	the	current	public	mood.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Can the Eurozone be more democratic? Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-06-25
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/06/25/can-the-eurozone-be-more-democratic/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Credit:	European	Council	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
German	views	on	euro-governance	are	more	complex	than	Juncker’s	and	Macron’s,	if	not	confused.	When
negotiating	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	some	like	Hans	Tietmeyer	(later	to	be	president	of	the	Bundesbank)	saw	the
necessity	of	building	a	political	union	in	Europe	before	embarking	on	a	single	currency.	This	was	dubbed	the
‘coronation	theory’	of	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union.	Others,	while	supporting	the	hotchpotch	political	union
placed	in	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	wanted	to	block	a	fiscal	union	for	fear	of	the	liabilities	to	Germany.	In	recent	years,
both	Merkel	and	her	former	finance	minister,	Wolfgang	Schauble,	have	talked	of	a	need	to	strengthen	economic
governance	in	the	eurozone.	But	they	have	emasculated	Bérégovoy’s	original	ideas	by	placing	them	firmly	within	the
traditional	German	rules-based	frame	of	‘ordo-liberalism’.	A	central	tenet	of	the	latter	is	to	place	responsibility	for
fiscal	policy	—	through	binding	rules	and	at	the	risk	of	penalties	—	on	national	governments.	This	leaves	little	scope
for	EU-level	competences.	Thus,	the	CDU	recently	issued	a	statement	rejecting	Macron’s	ideas	as	they	involve	“even
more	common	liabilities,	bureaucracy	and	centralism”.
Yet,	most	accept	that	the	provisions	for	eurozone	governance	remain	incomplete.	Merkel	may	agree	to	the	creation
of	some	kind	of	‘European	Monetary	Fund’	to	help	stabilisation	within	the	eurozone,	but	not	a	new	eurozone	budget
or	polity.	This	does	little	for	economic	convergence	or	democratic	processes.	In	a	wide-ranging	report	last	January,
fourteen	French	and	German	economists	attempted	to	outline	a	compromise	plan	for	eurozone	reform,	reconciling
the	risk-sharing	instincts	of	Paris	with	the	risk-control	sensitivities	of	Berlin.	While	they	recognised	the	relevance	of
‘adequate	accountability’	and	of	the	debate	over	a	possible	future	political	union,	they	choose	to	put	these	matters
largely	aside.	This	is	a	mistake	as	it	skews	the	debate.
How	can	the	EU	intervene	to	support	member	states	who	want	to	converge,	but	are	unable	to?
Somewhat	tellingly,	on	the	particular	issue	of	possible	bail-out	type	interventions	in	the	future,	they	saw	this
responsibility	being	given	to	an	expanded	European	Stability	Mechanism.	The	ESM	would	design	and	negotiate	the
conditional	assistance	programmes.	Its	board	of	directors	would	be	appointed	similar	to	that	of	the	IMF’s	governing
body.	And,	the	ESM’s	managing	director	would	be	obliged	to	answer	questions	from	the	European	Parliament.
Financial	control	—	whether	to	provide	the	money	—	would	remain	with	the	member	states.
Such	ideas	fail	the	test	of	democratic	legitimation.	They	are	akin	to	the	ECB	model:	experts	will	set	the	policy,
governments	will	determine	the	cash.	Thus,	they	may	be	little	advance	on	the	‘Troika’	mechanism,	representing	the
EU	and	the	IMF,	which	was	traduced	not	only	in	Athens	but	also	in	Dublin,	Lisbon,	and	Cyprus.	The	problem	of
legitimation	already	exists	and	needs	addressing.
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Moreover,	EU	member	states	inside	and	outside	the	single	currency	differ	greatly	in	their	domestic	institutional
capacities	to	deliver	structural	reforms.	Whether	following	the	Macron	model	of	creating	new	EU	institutions	or
settling	for	Merkel’s	insistence	on	a	rules-based	strategy,	there	is	a	need	to	connect	eurozone	governance	with	its
base	by	helping	member	states	strengthen	their	own	institutions.	In	its	paper	last	December,	the	Commission	picked
up	sensitive	questions:	How	can	the	EU	intervene	to	support	member	states	who	want	to	converge,	but	are	unable
to?	If	Berlin	rejects	the	Macron	model,	how	does	it	envisage	the	elaboration	of	bailout	conditionality	or	a	European
economic	agenda	being	made	more	democratic?
Macron’s	ideas	form	a	powerful	référentiel	for	a	necessary,	and	overdue,	debate.	The	onus	is	on	Berlin	to	explain	its
solution	to	the	problem	of	incomplete	euro-governance.	Its	current	minimalistic	approach	invites	long-term	of
shrinking	the	eurozone	or	making	it	even	more	exclusionary.	The	euro-crisis	has	shown	the	difficulties	facing	some
states	to	remaining	in	the	club	while	the	EU’s	heterogeneity	challenges	its	expansion.	Already,	the	status	quo	leaves
Germany	exposed	to	populist	attacks,	not	as	the	‘reluctant	hegemon’,	but	as	the	insensitive	despot.	It	is	the	hegemon
in	terms	of	the	policy	paradigm,	forcing	ordo-liberal	precepts	on	the	rest	of	Europe	and	often	usurping	the	role	of	EU
institutions.	Germany’s	post-war	chancellors	before	Merkel	have	feared	such	reputational	damage	and	have	sought
to	hide	its	raw	power	within	a	European	architecture.	So	in	the	absence	of	fully	worked	out	alternatives,	the	question
is:	Angela,	can	you	afford	to	ignore	Emmanuel?
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	post	also	appeared	on	the	Dahrendorf	Forum	site	and	LSE	Brexit.	The	article	gives	the	views	of
the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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